As Winston Churchill famously said “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”[1] Throughout its long and sometimes less than illustrious history the British Army has worked with many allies yet in the twentieth and twenty first century there has been no partner that it has cooperated with more closely than the US Military. But where did this partnership begin? The answer is the Second World War. Whilst the two nations armed forces worked together in the First World War it is with US entry into the Second World War that cemented what has become a close working partnership as well as the founding of the ‘special relationship.’ But what makes this relationship this close? This webpage will hope to demonstrate the evolution of this relationship throughout the years of the War that despite the obvious that the United States would become the dominant partner in this relationship it was quite often the US Military that was more willing to compromise to the junior partner despite their superiority and often in the face of British attitudes that went beyond the patronizing in an attempt to show that despite setback that they still knew best and have the US Army be the ones who endeavored to make this alliance work amicably even if it was at times for American self-interest rather than simply just being good allies to the British. This process will be dissected by looking at primary sources through memoirs and diaries as well as more contemporary accounts of the makings of this alliance. This webpage will be broken down into three sections British and American strategy, what the soldiers thought of their colleagues from the counterpart nation as well as some of the key figures who were instrumental in the running of the alliance and through.
Strategy
The Combined Chiefs of Staff with President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Casablanca, January 1943) Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/chiefs-of-staff-american-and-british-leaders [Accessed 11th January 2024]
When the United States entered the war in late 1941 the immediate question for British planners was how to get them into their immediate fight in North Africa? It is here that we see the first tension emerge with strategy. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff with the head of the US Army General George C Marshall being skeptical about US soldiers landing in North Africa as it might seen that the US Army was merely being used as part of an enterprise to save the British Empire[2] preferring a more direct approach with Marshall advocating for a cross channel invasion as early as 1942[3] this was to the dismay of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Alan Brooke who viewed the possibility of this negligible arguing that it would lead to nothing but “the loss of 6 divisions without achieving any result!”[4] What some of senior US Generals perhaps did not appreciate was the trauma both national and personal for the British with the great losses suffered fighting the German Army in the First World War as well as the humiliating defeat in the Battle of France and the retreat from Dunkirk in 1940 showing the British that taking on the Germans in North West Europe would be near impossible for them. This unwillingness on the British to send troops across the channel in 1942 certainly got under Marshals skin threatening to send US soldiers to the Pacific rather than what he regarded as a diversion in North Africa. He was overruled by president Roosevelt.
Roosevelt was dismissive of plans for an offensive in the Pacific as by committing troops in that theatre would seem to be abandoning their British allies[5] the British for their part to make what became Operation Torch more palatable to senior US commanders was that it was to be commanded by an American General Dwight D Eisenhower. Roosevelt may have been other motives beyond sheer altruism though. The US were incredibly new to the war with green troops that needed to be bloodied before facing the might of the Wehrmacht head on and needed battle experience before taking on the full might of Hitlers Reich, better to bloody the US Army in North Africa specifically landing in French Morrocco and Algeria where in theory the populace would welcome US forces and where there would be fighting it would not be so fierce. The other reason more sinister for the President wanting to land soldiers in North Africa is to get the US public behind the war with Germany as the American public wanted to pursue a Pacific first strategy[6] a way to convince the populace to pursue the fight against Germany would be a blood sacrifice fighting Germany in North Africa. Furthermore, if the allies had chosen to invade mainland Europe in 1942 the bulk of the forces would be British[7] giving the British and the ever-meddling Winston Churchill a veto over decisions. It can be argued that from an American perspective it would be better to wait for a cross channel invasion where the US would have more forces accumulated in Britain so it would have a greater say in the course of events in the event of a cross channel invasion. These concessions to the British whilst selfish prove that the US were willing to concede to British requests and ideas in order to make the partnership work.
The reasons for differences of opinion regarding the best strategy among allied chiefs may have something to do with national character or at least the perceptions of national character. The Americans viewed the British as being overly cautious and wanting to preserve their Empire probably not helped by the fact that the arch imperialist Winston Churchill was the Prime Minister. These frictions may have been further increased by the feeling of waning power not just within the confines of the war but on a broader geopolitical level it was becoming clear that the United States was slowly but surely eclipsing Britain as the preeminent world power[8] the senior British officers’ reaction to their US counterparts can be seen as the final throws of a dying Empire an Empire which many saw as a crucial part of Britain’s national identity especially in institutions such as the British Army, Alan Brookes official title was Chief of the Imperial General Staff after all which should be a clear indicator of how Army and Empire are linked. With this in mind it is easy to understand why the determination to continue to influence events to its will to prove it was still powerful.
The US Army had no such links throughout most of its history it had acted as a border force[9] within the confines of its own continent only recently going overseas with operations in the Philippines and the First World War although no doubt in British minds only at the very end. This can feed into a wider perception the British had of the Americans as amateurs of war and themselves as the professionals, better to fight the enemy where he is not as strong in North Africa and the Mediterranean than take him head on in Europe. This had unsurprising circumstances when the bulk of the war effort on the Western front was reliant on American arms combined with British led failures namely the disastrous Operation Market Garden that was supposed to end the war by Christmas it can be seen as the US Army the professionals and the British the amateurs.
A soldiers view
The old saying goes regarding the average Tommys view of the American GI was over paid, over sexed, and over here. There was such fear that US soldiers were far better off than their British counterparts that British Generals warned of a “violent contrast”[10] if British soldiers ever found out. With a saying like that one might think that there was immediate hostility among British and American soldiers. This is not the case and despite popular imagery of the US Army handing out items in scarce supply for favours this exchange is not entirely one way as American Private Henry Bowles said “you can go and get cigarettes and different kinds of candy bars”[11] This act is one of remarkable generosity considering the strict rationing that the British soldiers had to put up with. This was known by the Americans stationed in Britain with informational booklets as well as instructional films[12] that told US Soldiers how they should behave in Britain encouraging their soldiers to not show off what would like ostentatious wealth to the British by advising them to do things in moderation such as if they are drinking in a pub with British soldiers not buying expensive drinks that the Tommy would be unable to return. Another point of contention was Ireland with many US Soldiers being of Irish decent it was advised not to argue about the politics of the country.[13] This whilst seemingly simple shows yet again how far the US Army were willing to go to accommodate their British counterparts. The fact that such educational material was produced in the first place shows significant care on the US Armies leadership to prevent any mishaps that may lead to issues that would prevent British and American soldiers being able to function properly together in the field.
It must be wondered though why the animosity that appeared to be present among the higher echelons of these nations armed forces did not seep down into lower ranks? Simply most wanted the war to be over and wanted to go home most probably wondered what does it matter who the dominant world power out of the two really is?
The Big Beasts
This section of this webpage will focus on two of the instrumental figures of this alliance one American and one British one who made it his mission and gave it his all-in order to make it work and one who seemingly could not care less what state the partnership was in. Eisenhower and Montgomery.
General Dwight Eisenhower, US Army (Feb 1st 1945), Available at: https://www.thenmusa.org/biographies/dwight-david-eisenhower/ [Accessed 11th January 2024]
Eisenhower came from humble beginnings born in 1890 in Texas and raised in Kansas to becoming the Supreme Allied Commander is nothing short of extraordinary[14]. His appointment as commander in chief did come with some controversy however for Eisenhower had never commanded troops in battle before and he was about to work with British officers who both outranked him and had seen combat both in the Second World War and the First World War. This disparity in ranks would of done nothing to convince the British that the Americans knew what they were doing. To even out the disparity between ranks before launching operation Torch he was promoted from Major-General to Lieutenant-General[15]. He made no great impression upon his British hosts with Brooke confessing “He certainly made no great impression on me at our first meeting…and if I had been told then of the future that lay in front of him I should of refused to believe it.”[16] Brooke regarded him as a General more suited for politics[17] rather than a fighting one. This view that Brooke has of Eisenhower is perhaps a good demonstration of the perception that American commanders had of their British counterparts being stuck in the past not understanding that war has many levels including politics. This criticism is also rather moot as to relevance for as overall commander of operations his job can be seen as more managerial rather than that of war fighting about talking to the politicians above him so that the officers below him can focus on their job of fighting the Germans and winning the war. Even in the face of this attitude that his British counterparts had Eisenhower was dedicated to making the alliance work and to do this he made concessions to the British with some American officers talking behind his back viewing him as being overly pro-British[18] even going so far as to threaten to dismiss General George S Patton one of the US Army’s best for his anti-British sentiments “George, you are my oldest friend, but if you or anyone criticizes the British, by God I will send him home.”[19]
This is a powerful symbol that Eisenhower and more broadly the senior ranks of the US Army were giving it their all to make the alliance between these two nations work. Overall Eisenhower’s appointment to this position if an important indicator as to how dedicated the US were to building a strong alliance with the British by appointing someone who would act as an ally and not an American proves this.
Gobetz W, Statue of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, (Whitehall, London, 2006) Available at: https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/bernard-montgomery [Accessed 11th January 2024]
The other end of the scale of cooperation was Bernard L Montgomery. Montgomery unlike Eisenhower had seen conflict both in the First World War and the Irish War for Independence he was a seasoned soldier and a professional he thought he knew better than his American counterparts due to his experience and a more senior level of command with perhaps good reason as thirty-one out of forty-two US divisional[20] commanders had to be axed due to ineffectiveness. Combined with his low perception of American forces he was also arrogant, prickly and vein glorious in short not someone who suits the congenial running of an alliance. Whilst being a commander who could win battles, he was rather the embodiment of what the US Army thought of the British mainly slow[21] and overly cautious.
Montgomery viewed the American soldiers as being un trained and soft due to being too used to the luxuries of the United States[22] as American civilians had been largely untouched by the war. His boastfulness got him into trouble with his US allies after promising to capture Caen on the first day of Operation Overlord and failing to do so. What made matters worse is that he refused to admit that is plan wasn’t going accordingly insisting that this was what was to happen all along.[23] This is more problematic than it seems as from an American perspective it appeared as if it was them alone liberating France while the British were bogged down in Caen. Montgomery’s boastfulness harmed both himself and the British Army as a whole as it appeared for many to be a force that always over promises and under delivers.
His heavy-handed dealing with the Americans led him to be chastised by Brooke. Yet this didn’t seem to faze him he kept on making derogatory comments about the US Army and its efforts the breaking point for many was a disastrous press conference he gave during the Battle of the Bulge. During this press conference it was perceived that he was taking full responsibility for the success for victory[24] in the Ardennes despite it being a predominantly American battle. This caused uproar among his American colleagues causing Eisenhower ‘more distress and worry’[25] than anything else during his time as Supreme Allied Commander. Whilst Montgomery later admitted in his memoirs that the press conference was a mistake[26] the damage among his American colleagues was done. Montgomery’s attitudes and manner are a significant factor in Anglo-American relations as he always new just how to rub his allies up the wrong way as he never got the sack for it despite mounting pressure on Eisenhower to do so.
Conclusion
As this webpage has tried to demonstrate there has been one difficult customer in this relationship that being the British. Despite this cantankerousness the United States Army repeatedly time and time again conceded to British wishes and demands. Yet eventually the inevitable happened the US dictated terms[27] on the one hand this can be seen as America finally having enough of their junior partner always getting their way despite the bulk of the war effort being carried by their soldiers or it was because the British were unable to supply the numbers of troops that would be needed to have any sort of decisive say in the conduct and direction of the war[28]. In the wider context of international politics and military history this alliance at the point in covered in this webpage is crucial as in many ways it represents the desperate attempts not to hand over of the torch of world power. Whilst this essay focuses primarily on the European theatre of operations, we must not forget that this was a World War further avenues of study on this alliance could be focused on other areas of operations such as the India-China-Burma theatre. The study of the British Army working with allies could also go beyond the United States and focus on Britain’s other partners such as France. This study could also be broadened out to into more modern conflicts such as those recently fought in Afghanistan and Iraq where British and American forces worked together in tandem. Throughout the years of working together the legacy of those initial days of the Second World War many of the opinions that the Americans have of the British Army claiming it can achieve objectives that it simply has not got the means to accomplish. Yet this working partnership would not be possible if it were not for the trial and tribulations suffered throughout the Second World War with the US Army time and time again acquiescing.
Bibliography
Books:
Addison, P. The Road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War (London, Pimlico, 1994)
Beevor, A. Ardennes 1944: Hitler’s Last Gamble, (London, Penguin, 2016)
Beevor, A. The Second World War, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2014)
Brighton, T. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel Masters of War, (New York, Three Rivers Publishing, 2008)
Brooke, A. War Diaries 1939-1945, (London, Phoenix Books, 2002)
Caddick-Adams, P. 1945 Victory in the West, (
Calder, A. The Peoples War: Britain 1939-1945, (London, Pimlico, 2008)
Buruma I. The Churchill Complex: The Rise and Fall of the Special Relationship From Winston and FDR to Trump and Johnson (London, Atlantic Books, 2021)
David, S. Devil Dogs: First In, Last Out-King Company From Guadalcanal to the Shores of Japan, (London, William Collins, 2022)
Downing, T. 1942 Britain at the Brink, (London, Abacus, 2023)
Fennell J, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War, (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 2019)
Hastings, M. Finest Years Churchill as Warlord 1940-45, (London, Harper Press, 2010)
Horne, A and Montgomery, D, The Lonely Leader Monty 1944-1945, (London, Pan Books, 2013)
Holland, J. The War in the West A New History Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943, (London, Penguin, 2017)
Holmes, R. The World At War: The Landmark Oral History from the Previously Unpublished Archives, (London, Ebury Publishing, 2008)
Montgomery, B. The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, (Philadelphia, Pen & Sword Military, 2005)
Murray A, Command: How the Allies Learned to Win the Second World War, (London, Headline Publishing, 2022)
Patton, G. War as I Knew It, (London, Bantam Books, 1980)
Renfrew, B. Britain’s Black Regiments Fighting for Empire and Equality, (Gloucestershire, The History Press, 2020)
Renwick, R. Fighting wit Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War, (London, Biteback Publishing, 2016)
Roberts, A. Churchill: Walking with Destiny, (New York, Penguin, 2019)
Journal Articles:
Reynolds, C.G. ‘Admiral Ernest J King and The Strategy for Victory in the Pacific’, Naval War College Review, 28, (1976), pp. 57-64
Photos:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff with President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Casablanca, January 1943) Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/chiefs-of-staff-american-and-british-leaders [Accessed 11th January 2024]
Gobetz W, Statue of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, (Whitehall, London, 2006) Available at: https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/bernard-montgomery [Accessed 11th January 2024]
General Dwight Eisenhower, US Army (Feb 1st 1945), Available at: https://www.thenmusa.org/biographies/dwight-david-eisenhower/ [Accessed 11th January 2024]
Television:
World War Two: 1942 and Hitler’s Soft Underbelly, BBC 4, 15th October 2012, 21:00
Websites:
Art UK, Antony Beevor on Eisenhower’s portrait of Montgomery. Available at: https://artuk.org/discover/stories/antony-beevor-on-eisenhowers-portrait-of-montgomery [Accessed 9th January 2024]
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, D-Day: FDR and Churchill’s “Mighty Endeavor. Available at: https://www.fdrlibrary.org/mighty-endeavor#:~:text=Churchill%20observed%2C%20%E2%80%9CThere%20is%20only,mighty%20endeavor%E2%80%9D%20even%20more%20remarkable. [Accessed 8th January 2024]
National WW2 Museum, American Soldiers Arrive in the United Kingdom 1942. Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/american-soldiers-arrive-united-kingdom-1942 [Accessed 11th January 2024]
YouTube, A Welcome to Britain, 1943. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyYSBBE1DFw&ab_channel=USNationalArchives [Accessed 10th January 2024]
[1] Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, D-Day: FDR and Churchill’s “Mighty Endeavor. Available at: https://www.fdrlibrary.org/mighty-endeavor#:~:text=Churchill%20observed%2C%20%E2%80%9CThere%20is%20only,mighty%20endeavor%E2%80%9D%20even%20more%20remarkable. [Accessed 8th January 2024]
[2] Beevor, A. The Second World War, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2014) p. 340
[3] World War Two: 1942 and Hitler’s Soft Underbelly, BBC 4, 15th October 2012, 21:00
[4] Brooke, A. War Diaries 1939-1945, (London, Phoenix Books, 2002) p. 282
[5] Renwick, R. Fighting wit Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War, (London, Biteback Publishing, 2016) p. 54
[6] Beevor, A. The Second World War, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2014), p. 385
[7] Hastings, M. Finest Years Churchill as Warlord 1940-45, (London, Harper Press, 2010), p. 283
[8] Brighton, T. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel Masters of War, (New York, Three Rivers Publishing, 2008), p. 192
[9] Holland. J. The War in the West A New History Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943, (London, Penguin, 2017), p. 595
[10] Renfrew, B. Britain’s Black Regiments Fighting for Empire and Equality, (Gloucestershire, The History Press, 2020), p. 219
[11] Holland. J. The War in the West A New History Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943, (London, Penguin, 2017), p. 429
[12] YouTube, A Welcome to Britain, 1943. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyYSBBE1DFw&ab_channel=USNationalArchives [Accessed 10th January 2024]
[13] National WW2 Museum, American Soldiers Arrive in the United Kingdom 1942. Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/american-soldiers-arrive-united-kingdom-1942 [Accessed 11th January 2024]
[14] Holland. J, Normandy 44: D-Day and the Battle for France, (London, Corgi, 2020), p. 3
[15] Holland. J. The War in the West A New History Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943, (London, Penguin, 2017), p.322
[16] Brooke, A. War Diaries 1939-1945, (London, Phoenix Books, 2002), p. 276
[17] Downing, T, 1942 Britain at the Brink, (London, Abacus, 2023), p. 347
[18] Brighton, T. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel Masters of War, (New York, Three Rivers Publishing, 2008), p.119
[19] Brighton, T. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel Masters of War, (New York, Three Rivers Publishing, 2008), p. 175
[20] Holland. J. The War in the West A New History Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943, (London, Penguin, 2017), p. 595
[21] Patton, G. War as I Knew It, (London, Bantam Books, 1980), p. 185
[22] Brighton, T. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel Masters of War, (New York, Three Rivers Publishing, 2008), p. 185
[23] Montgomery, B. The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, (Philadelphia, Pen & Sword Military, 2005), p. 136
[24] Beevor, A. Ardennes 1944: Hitler’s Last Gamble, (London, Penguin, 2016), p. 329-330
[25] Horne, A and Montgomery, D, The Lonely Leader Monty 1944-1945, (London, Pan Books, 2013), p. 351
[26] Montgomery, B. The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, (Philadelphia, Pen & Sword Military, 2005), p. 314
[27] Hastings, M. Finest Years Churchill as Warlord 1940-45, (London, Harper Press, 2010), p. 595
[28] Holmes, R. The World At War: The Landmark Oral History from the Previously Unpublished Archives, (London, Ebury Publishing, 2008), p. 370