How did the British Army’s interventionist campaigns throughout the 1990s and early 2000s influence its public image?

Ockenden, T. (1999). People greet the British Army In Kosovo in June 1999. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/uk-troops-failed-to-ptotect-kosovo-citizens-court-hears (Accessed 19/12/2023)

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the British Army engaged in multiple interventionist campaigns in several countries. This website focuses on operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Iraq between 1992 and 2003, as these are the most influential campaigns of this time period and had the strongest effect upon the British Army’s public image. This era of interventionism is largely considered the most successful period of British campaigns in modern history, as it resulted in relatively low British casualties, the objective of each campaign was achieved, and the majority of campaigns were conducted with strong public support. It also contrasted massively to the highly unpopular campaign in Northern Ireland during the 1980s, helping to highlight how successful the 1990s and 2000s were by showing that the campaigns could have concluded with a much worse result. The intervention campaigns of the 1990s and 2000s had a profoundly positive influence on the British Army’s public image, and portrayed it as a professional peacekeeping force, showing the international community that an army can be a flexible organisation designed for aiding civilians as well as fighting.

There are several ways to categorise military interventions. For the purpose of this research, I have separated them into humanitarian, self-defence, and power-showing. Categorising different types of interventions is very important when considering how they influence public opinion, as generally the public are more supportive of campaigns that are designed to aid the civilian population, such as a humanitarian intervention and self-defence, whereas the public tend to view military action for national interest such as power-showing interventions more negatively. As the majority of the campaigns mentioned in this webpage occurred under Tony Blair’s labour government and were in keeping with his policy of ‘moral obligation’, this webpage will mostly focus on humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions became increasingly common during the 1990s and 2000s by Western states due to the fall of the USSR in 1991, allowing them more freedom to act without threat of retaliation if the USSR disagreed with their actions.[1] The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine by the UN in 2005 (Paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document) also gave Western states more support when intervening in humanitarian crises, as it gave grounds for them to legally intervene when a state was failing to protect its population from atrocities.[2] Both of these factors greatly swayed public perception towards military intervention during the 1990s and 2000s, as the public were more likely to support an intervention if there was no chance of it causing a wider conflict with a global superpower such as the USSR, and if the intervention had legal backing from an international body like the UN.

National Army Museum (1993). Members of The Royal Anglian Regiment meet Bosnian villagers, 1993 (c). Available at: https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1996-02-238-12 (Accessed 27/12/2023)

The first of the significant intervention campaigns during this era was Operation Grapple, conducted in Bosnia in 1992 through to 1995. Op Grapple can be classified as a humanitarian intervention, as the main objective of this operation was to ensure UN aid convoys were able to reach Bosnian refugees.[3] In addition, Operation Grapple aimed to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the minority ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnian Muslims, by other larger ethnic groups, such as the Bosnian Serbs, by creating safe zones protected by British troops for these vulnerable civilians to live while their armed forces fought over population centres such as Sarajevo. Op Grapple had a tremendous impact on the way the British public viewed the British Army, as it was the first significant intervention they had undertaken since the highly unpopular Troubles through the 1970s and 80s.

Unfortunately, Op Grapple did somewhat negatively affect the British Army’s public image as the campaign was defined by several massacres of ethnic groups that British forces were there to protect. For example, British forces took much of the blame for not preventing the Srebrenica massacre, where around 8000 unarmed Muslim men and boys were shot dead by Serb forces. In 1992, the UN had placed an arms embargo upon all sides of the conflict, meaning that no faction would be allowed to purchase weapons from UN member states. However, this only led to the smaller faction of the Bosnian Muslims being unable to defend themselves against the enormous Serb army.[4] This severely damaged the public image of the British Army as it portrayed their leadership as incompetent by agreeing to take part in this embargo, or at least not attempting to block its creation, as a lead state in the intervention. It was only after the Srebrenica massacre that NATO was finally allowed to conduct airstrikes upon Serb forces by the UN, which in turn led to the end of hostilities within 20 days of airstrikes beginning. It is widely viewed that had Britain led NATO and applied to the UN for permission to begin airstrikes sooner, massacres such as Srebrenica could have been prevented. The risk to British casualties also greatly affected the public’s perception of this campaign. Based off polls, public support for Op Grapple waned between April 1993 and July 1995, and it was within this period that British forces took their first casualties of the campaign and a group of British soldiers were taken hostage. This made it clear that the public only supported a short and successful campaign in Bosnia, that did not carry great risk to British troops and would not be drawn out over several years as the Troubles had done.

However, overall Op Grapple did present the British Army in a very positive light, mostly due to the humanitarian aid aspect of the mission. According to the Guardian, over two thirds of the British public supported intervention in Bosnia in April 1993,[5] even after the campaign had started and continued for six months. This is likely because the public saw the operation as an opportunity to use British forces for good, feeling it was their moral duty to use their professional forces to prevent the ethnic cleansing occurring. As Michael Portillo (Defence Secretary in 1995) stated in Parliament, Op Grapple and the British Army “helped save many thousands of lives” and the British public were “very proud of them, as they should be proud of themselves”.[6] Op Grapple also presented the British Army as a much more professional peacekeeping force than it had seemed during the Troubles, which was blighted with civilian deaths and often outperformed by IRA guerrilla fighters. In Bosnia, the British Army were much tighter with their rules of engagement and complied with all UN regulations, ensuring a very limited number of civilian deaths, and proving to the British public after the Troubles that successful military intervention was possible.

Sergeant David John Miles (1999). Warrant Officer Garry Pilchowski and Corporal Major Terry Flanagan with members of the Hyseni family, 1999. Available at: https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=2001-09-62-1 (Accessed 27/12/2023)

The next military intervention British forces conducted in this era was the intervention in Kosovo as part of NATOs ‘peace implementation force’ (KFOR), beginning on 12th June 1999 and designed to halt the Serb advance into Kosovo, disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and prevent a further ethnic cleansing of the majority Albanian population. For these reasons, the intervention in Kosovo can be considered a humanitarian intervention, as it aimed to save the lives of the local population from foreign and domestic aggression, and the intervention was not conducted with any concern for potential gain for Britain. 4000 British troops, most notably the Parachute Regiment, were sent to Kosovo along with a 40,000 strong American-led NATO force in order to secure key areas and protect the populations there. NATO also began a precision bombing campaign against the Serbs in March 1999 to pressure them in negotiating a ceasefire. By 20th June, a full Serbian withdrawal out of Kosovo had been completed and the KLA had signed a treaty promising to disarm within 90 days of the signing.

Much like Op Grapple, British operations in Kosovo alongside KFOR shone the British Army in a particularly positive light. As Kosovo was a humanitarian intervention conducted under Tony Blair’s policy of ‘moral obligation’, designed to protect the ethnic Albanian population from Serb aggression, it is no wonder that it was already overwhelmingly popular with the British public before ground operations even began. An ICM poll from early 1999 showed that 54% of voters supported military action against Serbia, and only 33% of voters opposed the intervention.[7] This poll was conducted after statistics on civilian casualties from NATO’s aerial campaign were released, showing how the public supported this campaign on a moral level so much that they were willing to accept civilian casualties in order to achieve the overall mission. The same poll also showed that 51% of the British public were supportive of using British ground troops to solve the crisis,[8] again highlighting how the majority of the British public felt such a strong moral obligation to the people of Kosovo that they were willing to risk British casualties to prevent further Serb aggression. The British Army’s image also benefitted massively from the choice of ground troops wearing more casual uniforms rather than their normal battle dress.[9] This choice of donning berets over helmets and rejection of camouflage cream and body armour when engaging with the local population gave the British Army a more humane and friendly image and was especially popular with the local people and media at home. This is demonstrated by the rather humorous fact that the name ‘Tonibler’ became increasingly popular for new-born boys in Kosovo after the intervention, in recognition of Tony Blair’s role in freeing their country from Serbian invaders.[10] Thus, operations in Kosovo enhanced the British Army’s public image as the British public felt it was their moral obligation to intervene in the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo people, as proven by the poll results. The professionalism of the British Army during the campaign through their engagement with the local people also positively impacted their public image, as they appeared to have learnt lessons from Bosnia and Northern Ireland and came across as very effective peacekeepers.

The British Army’s image was slightly tainted by their intervention in Kosovo however, mostly through information revealed after the campaign by the media. For example, the Guardian accused the British Army and MoD of not functioning as professional bodies during Kosovo due to several failures with equipment and logistics. According to the Guardian, there were failures in half of the Royal Navy’s missiles used during the aerial attack, a lack of spare parts for half of the Navy’s harrier jets, and the use of insecure communication systems that the Serbs and even local media were able to monitor.[11] Furthermore, the same source states that the MoD were unable to handle a £113m contract for hard-standing shelters for British troops, leaving them in tents during the cold Balkan winter. These mishandlings did somewhat damage the public image of the British Army as it portrays them as unorganized and unable to properly care for their troops or maintain their equipment. However, it did not have a significant impact on their image, as British troops still behaved professionally throughout the campaign. Unfortunately, it is the civilian casualties during the NATO aerial campaign that tarnishes the British public image the most, as they failed to obtain UN security council clearance for the bombings[12]. This is a clear violation of the UN Charter of 1949 that says that member states cannot conduct military operations without security council clearance. Had NATO secured UN backing for their air campaign, this could have made the approximately 500 Serbian civilian deaths[13] more morally excusable as support from an international organisation could have gained more public support by providing more legitimacy to the campaign. Despite these unfortunate civilian casualties and the lack of security council clearance however, it is irrefutable that the Kosovo intervention was a resounding success, and thus had an overall positive impact on the British Army’s public image.

The Parachute Regiment (2000). 1 PARA patrols. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/PARA/posts/first-week-in-may-2000-op-palliser-sierra-leonein-the-first-week-of-may-2000-ruf/4295319510499795/ (Accessed 27/12/2023)

British forces conducted another military intervention in May 2000 in Sierra Leone, codenamed Operation Palliser. Similar to previous campaigns, this was a humanitarian intervention initially designed to ensure foreign citizens and diplomats were evacuated from the country safely by securing Freetown airport, following the RUFs advance into Freetown and ensuing firefights during the Sierra Leone Civil War. The operation developed significantly throughout 2000, as once all evacuations were completed the British Army were used to rescue besieged UN peacekeepers in the country as part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. British troops then began training Sierra Leone Army soldiers for confrontations with the RUF, before eventually the RUF disarmed in September 2000 and Op Palliser was completed. Much like the intervention in Kosovo, it is important to note that Op Palliser occurred under Tony Blair’s policy of ‘moral obligation’ and the British government had nothing to gain from this intervention aside from goodwill from the Sierra Leonian government and people, thus cementing the fact that this intervention was undoubtedly a humanitarian one.

Many military historians agree that Op Palliser can be considered the gold standard of military intervention in recent times and presented the British Army in a particularly favourable light. This is because it was incredibly popular not only with the people of Sierra Leone, who still see Tony Blair and the British military as heroes,[14] but also the British public. This is evidenced through a British Social Attitudes survey from both 1995 and 2003, where respondents in both surveys said they were “very proud” of their armed forces. Between 1995 and 2003 there was an upward increase in the amount of people who answered “very proud”,[15] suggesting that the success of Op Palliser between these years helped to increase this positive perception. Intervention in Sierra Leone also helped to bolster the British Army’s image as a professional organisation, as only one casualty was taken through the whole operation and the civil war that had raged since 1991 was ended within four months of the British arrival. The British intervention was also helped to appear more professional due to the initial lack-lustre performance of the UN in Sierra Leone, with approximately 500 UN peacekeepers taken prisoner by the RUF in April 2000[16], as well as the SAS’ performance during Op Barras where they rescued six captured British soldiers. As there were no events during Op Palliser that had a negative effect on the public’s perception of the British Army, it is safe to say that Op Palliser had a completely positive impact on the British Army’s public image.

WO2 Giles Penfound (2003). A civilian walks in front of a Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle of the 1st Battalion, The Irish Guards, Iraq, March 2003. Available at: https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=2005-01-67-25 (Accessed 27/12/2023)

The final significant intervention that British forces conducted in this era was Operation Telic 1, officially from January to July 2003, although the invasion took place on 20th March and ended 1st May 2003.This intervention is somewhat of an anomaly compared to the others previously mentioned, as while it did occur under the Blair government, it cannot be considered a humanitarian intervention under his ‘moral obligation’ policy and instead is considered more of a combination of a self-defence and power-showing intervention. Op Telic was a combined US-UK invasion of Iraq involving 45,000 British troops with the intention of toppling Saddam Hussain and finding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that Hussain had supposedly been building for use against the Western world. Approximately 6,616 Iraqi civilians were killed in the initial invasion phase of the campaign[17] that lasted just over a month, along with 44 British soldiers.

Intervention in Iraq was met with the biggest public backlash seen for military action in the 21st Century, and public opinion was mostly against it. It was met with the biggest anti-war rally ever seen in the UK, with the ‘Stop the War’ protests across the UK in 2003 attracting around two million people. Much of the backlash for the invasion of Iraq however has been seen many years after the events took place. IN 2015, YouGov reported that only 26% of the British public believed intervention in Iraq was correct, compared to 51% who disagreed with it.[18] This is likely due to the fact that no WMDs were ever found in Iraq, and the revealing of information such as the number of civilian casualties and the Butler Report that stated that evidence for the existence of WMDs supplied by MI6 and used by the government to justify the invasion was unreliable. As in Kosovo, the British Army’s image was damaged as they did not obtain UN Security Council clearance for the invasion of Iraq. Had they done this, the invasion could have been seen as more legitimate and objectively the right course of action at the time. An IPSOS poll found that had UN inspectors found solid evidence for WMDs, or a UN resolution for the invasion was passed, 74% of the British public would have supported the invasion.[19]  Instead, the public view the invasion as an unnecessary waste of money and human lives. It is clear that the public have a deep distrust of the government’s motivations for the invasion of Iraq, with many believing the real intention was to secure Western states oil supplies. The lasting impact of Op Telic 1 is obvious too as despite a revival in 2014/15 for action against ISIS, levels of public support for other military interventions since Iraq have never been the same as they were pre-2003.[20]

However, Iraq did not have a completely negative effect on the British Army’s public image. A YouGov poll in 2003 found that 54% of respondents actually supported the invasion at the time.[21] Furthermore, the attendees to the ‘Stop the War’ rally were not representative of British society and consisted mostly of left-wing students and graduates. Only 5% of a British Social Attitudes survey in 2012 reported taking part in the rally.[22] In addition, while much of the public appear to disagree with the motivations behind the campaign, no disagreement with the conduct of troops during Op Telic 1 has been found. This highlights how despite fighting an unpopular war, British troops and the Army itself still behaved as a professional organisation and fought well, ending the invasion phase within 2 months of it beginning. Thus, while the intervention itself was highly unpopular with the public in later years, Op Telic 1 did not do significant damage to the public image of the British Army.

In conclusion, it is clear that British intervention campaigns during the 1990s and 2000s had a profoundly positive impact on the Army’s public image. This is mostly due to the humanitarian aspect of these interventions, as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone were all conducted for the benefit of the host country’s population, instead of the interest of Britain. Furthermore, the professionalism demonstrated by British soldiers throughout these campaigns boosted the public opinion of the military hugely, as they came across as both a world-leading fighting force and competent peacekeeping force. Despite some failings of the government and MoD in both Kosovo and Iraq and the controversial motive behind Op Telic 1 doing some damage to the Army’s image, these problems were overshadowed by the brilliant performance of the British Army in all interventions. Therefore, British intervention campaigns during the 1990s and 2000s positively influenced the Army’s public image to a great extent.

[1] UK Parliament. (2015). To intervene or not to intervene? Military operations overseas. [Online]. UK Parliament. Last Updated: May 2015. Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/defence-and-security/uk-foreign-intervention/ [Accessed 21 December 2023].

[2] United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Responsibility to Protect. [Online]. United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml#:~:text=Each%20individual%20State%20has%20the,through%20appropriate%20and%20necessary%20means [Accessed 21 December 2023].

[3] Marshall, R. D. Operation Grapple: British Armed Forces in UN Protection Force. [Online]. Federation of American Scientists. Available at: https://irp.fas.org/agency/army/mipb/1996-4/marshall.htm [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[4] Bogdanor, V. (2012). Srebrenica: the silence over Britain’s guilt must be ended. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/12/srebrenica-massacre-bosnia-and-herzegovina [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[5] Bogdanor, V. (2012). Srebrenica: the silence over Britain’s guilt must be ended. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/12/srebrenica-massacre-bosnia-and-herzegovina [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[6] Portillo, M., Secretary of State for Defence. (1995). Bosnia (Peace Settlement). [Online]. Hansard. Last Updated: 12 December 1995. https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1995-12-12/debates/cae12f85-340f-49fd-8ca5-eace126cba07/Bosnia(PeaceSettlement) [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[7] Travis, A. (1999). Voters still divided on sending ground troops to Kosovo. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/jun/01/alantravis1 [Accessed 2 Aug. 2020].

[8] Travis, A. (1999). Voters still divided on sending ground troops to Kosovo. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/jun/01/alantravis1 [Accessed 2 Aug. 2020].

[9] National Army Museum. Kosovo. [Online]. National Army Museum. Available at: https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/kosovo#:~:text=As%20the%20country%20became%20more,and%20stability%20in%20the%20country  [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[10] Thomas, P. (2010). Tony Blair Meets His Namesakes in Kosovo. [Online]. Sky News. Last Updated: 9 July 2010. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/tony-blair-meets-his-namesakes-in-kosovo-10493327 [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[11] Norton-Taylor, R. (2000). Revealed: how war in Kosovo exposed weaknesses in Britain’s armed forces. The Guardian. [online] 6 Jun. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/jun/06/balkans [Accessed 24 Nov. 2023].

[12] National Army Museum. Kosovo. [Online]. National Army Museum. Available at: https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/kosovo#:~:text=As%20the%20country%20became%20more,and%20stability%20in%20the%20country  [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[13] Human Rights Watch. (2000). Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign. [Online]. Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200.htm#TopOfPage [Accessed 22 December 2023].

[14] Renton, A. (2010). Sierra Leone: one place where Tony Blair remains an unquestioned hero. [Online]. the Guardian. Last Updated: 18 April 2010. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/18/sierra-leone-international-aid-blair [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[15] British Social Attitudes. Armed Forces: Public Opinion Over Time. [Online]. British Social Attitudes. Available at: https://bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-29/armed-forces/public-opinion-over-time.aspx [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[16] Farah, D. (2000). U.N. Rescues Hostages in Sierra Leone. [Online]. Washington Post. Last Updated: 16 July 2000. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/07/16/un-rescues-hostages-in-sierra-leone/e17f58e7-ec24-4222-8acc-bb78faddcee3/ [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[17] Iraq Body Count. (2005). A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003-2005. [Online]. Iraq Body Count. Last Updated: 18 July 2005. Available at: https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/press-releases/12/ [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[18] Dahlgreen, W. (2015). Memories of Iraq: did we ever support the war? [Online]. YouGov. Last Updated: 3rd June 2015. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/12483-remembering-iraq?redirect_from=%2Ftopics%2Fpolitics%2Farticles-reports%2F2015%2F06%2F03%2Fremembering-iraq [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[19] Holmes, F. (2020). Public Attitudes to Military Interventionism. London: The British Foreign Policy Group. p.9-11.

[20] Holmes, F. (2020). Public Attitudes to Military Interventionism. London: The British Foreign Policy Group. p.9-11.

[21] Dahlgreen, W. (2015). Memories of Iraq: did we ever support the war? [Online]. YouGov. Last Updated: 3rd June 2015. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/12483-remembering-iraq?redirect_from=%2Ftopics%2Fpolitics%2Farticles-reports%2F2015%2F06%2F03%2Fremembering-iraq [Accessed 27 December 2023].

[22] Holmes, F. (2020). Public Attitudes to Military Interventionism. London: The British Foreign Policy Group. p.9-11.

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