Mystery and misinformation- what happened on Bloody Sunday?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The disastrous and tragic consequences of violence in Bogside could not be ignored. An immediate and serious response was warranted, unusually for frequently ignored Northern Irish affairs. PM Edward Heath (of the Conservative Party) sparked the discussion in the most \u2018official\u2019 forum, the House of Commons. An emergency meeting was held on February 1st<\/sup> to express \u2018deep anxiety\u2019 at the tension in Northern Ireland, resulting in the deaths of unnamed people whose circumstances were not deemed contextually important or worthy of acknowledgement in the British Parliaments introduction to Bloody Sunday discourse. The discussion as it was planned by the Home Secretary Reginald Maudling was derailed quickly. The swift challenge to the attempts at narrative domination was important, yet futile in comparison to the determination of the British government to absolve its soldiers. The focal points of this debate, thanks to the persistence of Irish allied MPs, was the status and actions of the victims and soldiers and the need for legal and judicial response. Of course, such a discussion needs at least some factual basis. However, the information broadcasted in the House of Commons debate was not reliable. Factual verification didn\u2019t happen so shortly after the fact, so the process was a central focus of the debate. This is significant as a publicly available series[1]<\/a>, and first discussion in the political realm. Maulding\u2019s stance is rigid, without nuance. He repeatedly reasserts his view, which was parroted by British media and political spheres constantly, as was typical of British reporting at that time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Maudling almost immediately allocates blame to the people of Derry rather than British soldiers. His opening statement is interrupted with a challenge after he says those civilians present attacked the soldiers first with bombs and firearms. Bernadette Devlin, the MP for Mid-Ulster, challenges the statement, asking \u2018is it in order for the Minister to lie?\u2019 He responds introducing what would become the Widgery Inquiry, which he assured would be swift and impartial. The discussion moves on, after Devlin\u2019 assault on the Home Secretary, to the demand for international intervention. Mr Chichester Clark, PM of Northern Ireland, questions the capability (and willingness) of the British government to conduct the inquiry. He asks the involvement of an international body, naming the UN, to provide an impartial report and conflict mediation on the ground. This is the first call for the involvement of international law, damning evidence of Irish mistrust of British institutions, worsening after its publishing in April 1972.<\/p>\n\n\n Pictured: <\/strong>a tabloid news article using passive language to defend soldiers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Toward the end of 1972, the Widgery report was published. It found overwhelmingly in favour of the British army, as foreshadowed by the House of Commons Debate. It was decided that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018It was suggested that Para had been specifically brought\u2026 to send a punitive force\u2026 give the residents a rough handling to discourage them\u2026 There is not a shred of evidence to support these suggestions.\u2019[2]<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Soldiers\u2026 fired upon them in accordance with the standing orders of the Yellow Card.\u2019[3]<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This constitutes a pivotal point for the perceptions of conflict in Northern Ireland, providing reinforcement for the ultimately baseless and contradictory British self-defence argument and further alienating grieving Irish citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018It was a whitewash. The guilty were found to be innocent. The innocent were found to be guilty. It was a complete travesty of justice.\u2019[4]<\/strong><\/em><\/a>Father Edward Daly<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n The stark difference in these conclusions indicates the relevance of historiographical analysis. The majority of evidence used in the creation of this website is archival, from the Northern Irish institution Ulster University. In the process of my initial research for this project a large proportion of available sources were oral histories of some kind. This speaks to the initially unclear nature of the conflict, as the oral history method is used to give a voice back to often ignored marginalised groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The scale and severity of damage to the Irish Catholic community in Derry was enormous. The actions of colonial soldiers, and the rampant unchecked and dishonest accusations against present civilians was argued by MP Chichester-Clark in the initial debate. There is sound legal basis for this request. Of the criteria for war crimes defined by the Geneva convention[5]<\/a>, British conduct on Bloody Sunday violates the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.a.i. Wilful killing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tangible proof for such an action is hard to find, however autopsies found victims had been \u2018shot in the back\u2019[6]<\/a> decreasing the credibility of the British self-defence argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n British conduct in Derry on Bloody Sunday was rogue. The Yellow Card, instructions for the Parachute Regiment, forbade soldiers from using more than the minimum force,[7]<\/a> but multiple victims had been shot twice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.b.ii. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The British Army had assumed position in abandoned buildings firing on civilian crowds. This was the result of botched intelligence, \u2018skewed to target Catholics\u2026 out of date.\u2019[8]<\/a> The later Saville Report absolved \u2018unarmed rioters\u2019[9]<\/a> of wrongdoing,<\/p>\n\n\n\n Either of these conditions would warrant UN mediation, yet the request for intervention never materialised, since the conflict was deemed to be domestic in nature. Still, the mere request forms a defined new level of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the more significant changes stemming from the shock and loss of Bloody Sunday is in the methods at the new forefront of activism. Traditionally, Irish Republicans practiced abstentionism, a \u2018policy held\u2026 by Sinn Fein, to not allow its members, where elected, to sit in certain parliaments or assemblies\u2019[10]<\/a> specifically in London, Dublin and Belfast. This \u2018central plank\u2019 of Irish Republican political strategy, lasted around 100 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Bernadette Devlin was elected at 22 in 1969 as an Independent Unity candidate, and the youngest female MP ever. She\u2019s more an exception to the \u2018rule\u2019 of abstentionism in the traditional Irish Republican school of thought than any representation of miraculous newfound faith in Westminster. Sinn Fein still adhered to this policy until the 1980s. Despite this achievement, mainstream political participation in Northern Ireland was dire. Protestants held far greater political power than Catholics, by way of their property ownership and relationship (as mostly Unionist) with the British. Their already commanding power was not enough, the tendency of a privileged group to protect their interests at others expense is frequent[11]<\/a> and known. This is evident in the overrepresentation of Protestants in local Councils and diminished suffrage for Catholics, who could only vote if they held property, allocated by Protestant councils. This was exacerbated by \u2018malapportionment and gerrymandering\u2019[12]<\/a>, the fixing of electoral boundaries to overrepresent one group compared to another. Hence the slogan \u2018one man, one vote.\u2019 Means to uphold majority Protestant political domination was based upon the combined power of local Council and Nationally held positions. The contact hypothesis of inter-group conflict, that groups with infrequent contact will continue to be at odds,[13]<\/a> explains well the persistence of the Troubles, and vicious instances of Protestant-Catholic contact. Even the separate school system contributed to this effect.[14]<\/a> According to the ecological inference method of statistical analysis (Wittenburg et al. 2007,) religious communities vote more consistently for parties they are represented in. Catholic communities vote for Catholic parties, and \u2018the Unionist Party-dominated Stormont regime commanded allegiance from most Protestants\u2019[15]<\/a> So one factor for the overrepresentation of Protestants in positions of political power[16]<\/a> is the fact that was a pre-existing condition, and another the wildly overwhelmingly Protestant make-up of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.[17]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n These are clear-cut deprivations of civil rights. The formation of NICRA, the most persevering of the Northern Irish civil rights groups (alongside the CSJ and DHAC) in February 1967, is evidence of the exhaustion of the Catholic people with their status as second-class citizens. It was a partisinally neutral body, characterised by \u2018peaceful, non-violent\u2019 action. [18]<\/a>One of the first marches for civil rights (an umbrella term) took place in October that year, interrupted and halted by RUC, baton charging at the crowd, despite the \u2018minority of whom\u2019[19]<\/a> that acted violently. In 1971, the cause was further justified by the implementation of internment policy, an \u2018illegitimate means applied by the Unionist government\u2019[20]<\/a> to hold detainees without any semblance of a trial.<\/p>\n\n\n Pictured: <\/strong>a NICRA Banner at the march on January 30th on Westland St.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Only a week prior to Bloody Sunday, an anti-internment march was held at Magilligan Strand. The same Parachute Regiment was transported from Belfast to serve. The march leader, Stormont MP John Hume, describes a similar descension into violence. He testified soldiers were \u2018beating, brutalising, and terrorising the demonstrators\u2019[21]<\/a>, having to be restrained by fellow officers. In this sense, Bloody Sunday represents a pattern of extrajudicial action in the already violent oppression of Irish citizens. So any protest action by Catholics was repressed, a condition solidified in law on January 18th<\/sup> 1972, when PM Brian Faulkner banned all marches until the end of the year. The eventual reaction to largely unarmed riots as an aftermath of denied peaceful protest on the 30th<\/sup> January was not a watershed moment. It was an unrefined but repeated strategy with a new basis in law and justification for punishment. It\u2019s therefore true that Bloody Sunday started with a technically illegal march, but the legality of such a ban is unsteady in terms of Human Rights legislation. Despite Bogside\u2019s unique historical status as a \u201cno-go area\u201d (the 1969 Battle of Bogside was another defining moment of the Troubles Era,) demonstrations in solidarity with the victims of Bloody Sunday caused more illegal marches in its memory. This constitutes a watershed moment, since the people across the country had become emboldened in breaking the unfair laws, regardless of consequence. The existing political repression, and the reeling shock following January 30th<\/sup> \u2018left few untouched by the violence, instability and social polarisation that characterized the era.\u2019[22]<\/a> Unfortunately, but somewhat logically, this circumstance would lead to another significant change; the introduction of Direct Rule in Ireland beginning March 1972, with the suspension of the Stormont parliament. This escalation of British interference for colonial purposes can absolutely be said to derive from a chain of events accelerated by the horrors of Bloody Sunday. As a consequence of Direct Rule, \u2018participation in formal party politics became more dangerous,\u2019[23]<\/a> and the sovereignty of Northern Ireland was jeopardised again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important of the society-defining effects of the Bloody Sunday was the radicalisation of a younger generation of Catholics; Reverend Edward Daly says \u2018many young people in Prison\u2026 would never have joined the IRA had it not been for what they witnessed on Bloody Sunday.\u2019[24]<\/a> The IRA volunteers, now having first-hand experience of British occupation, believed wholeheartedly that \u2018its struggle both militarily and politically was morally justified.\u2019 [25]<\/a> The reinvigoration of the Provisional IRA compared to the stalling NICRA constitutes a watershed moment in terms of the impact of Bloody Sunday. Though another factor in this shift is the cooperation of NICRA with the British government in the Widgery inquiry. Others believed this report should have been conducted by another completely impartial body. Again, the UN was named. Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, says outright that Bloody Sunday was a \u2018watershed moment,\u2019[26]<\/a> describing the flood of \u2018money, guns and recruits into the IRA afterwards.\u2019 The transition into armed struggle was a clear escalation from the previously dwindling membership.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The consequences of the events and aftermath of Bloody Sunday on Northern Irish culture (to a lesser extent in the Republic of Ireland) was profound and devastating. The 1st<\/sup> February was declared a day of mourning in all of Ireland, a rare display of unity between the North and South. Mass vigils were held across the country, and efforts were made to empower the victims while preserving the message gathered from their deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet it also instilled a sense of determination in the Northern Irish people. It altered the course of the Troubles era. Speculation on alternative courses is futile, but this specific incidence of violence by British soldiers against politically active civilians was a driving force in the reinvigoration of the militant Provisional IRA, and a nail in the coffin for Northern Irish faith in the British state as a potential protector or saviour. The extent of this cannot be understated, the message was clear enough, as on February 2nd<\/sup> a peaceful demonstration devolved into a fire at the British Embassy in Dublin; crowds did not scatter but watched as it burned, chanting \u2018burn, burn, burn!\u2019 Direct action was not always this uncoordinated, which could render it anomalous or haphazard. This is not the case, therefore it is sustained enough to constitute watershed movement as changes observed above manifested gradually rather than immediately. Between 10-30,000 participated in workplace walkouts staged as arranged by councils in villages, towns and cities across the country, including Dublin. These were organised by trade unionists (not to be confused with Unionists) though \u2018large numbers of non-trade unionists and were the biggest union-led demonstrations\u2026 perhaps ever.\u2019[28]<\/a> This is yet another testament to the transcending popular appeal of the cause for justice for the 13 dead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That was the point of realisation for me that the penalty for demanding civil rights in your society was that your government would kill you.Bernadette Devlin MP<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n More documentation of the provocative and profound nature of the reaction to Bloody Sunday can be found in the Northern Irish cultural and artistic sphere, as would become a vital distinctive tool of Irish independence activists. The victims of Bloody Sunday are now immortalised through art, usually the medium of street murals, showing again the community spirit of areas bonded by historical trauma and extent of the awareness of Bloody Sunday.<\/p>\n\n\n Pictured above:<\/strong> a mural depicting the victims of Bloody Sunday, completed in Lisfannon Park in 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n John Lennon, former Beatles member put out the song \u2018Sunday, Bloody Sunday\u2019 in 1972, which peaked in UK charts at 11, and entered charts abroad. The way the aftermath of January 30th<\/sup> intensified political awareness then spilled over the political sphere within Northern Ireland and broke into global consciousness is a watershed moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arguably, the final resolution to the circumstances bought on by Bloody Sunday (the most heavily prosecuted event for British soldiers, in favour of the watershed moment hypothesis) came very recently. On September 18th<\/sup> 2023, the Troubles Reconciliation Act was passed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018An Act to address the Northern Ireland Troubles and promote reconciliation by establishing an Independent Commission\u2026 limiting criminal investigations\u2026 providing for experiences to be recorded and preserved and for events to be studied and memorialised.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a stark difference from the biased Widgery Inquiry, and the legal declaration that the newly formed Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery would be not only responsible for but committed to;<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Bloody Sunday was a watershed moment in the execution of British foreign policy. Ignorance and omission usually defined the British Army\u2019s public representation approach, but such a brazenly dishonest narratives had not yet been broadcast to the public. The \u2018denial of military accountability has facilitated the British governments disregard for known abuses of civilians.\u2019[30]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> The crafting of the British narrative was purposeful though. For as long as the British involvement in the war in Ireland was viewed as a \u2018war on terror,\u2019 a term the British and Northern Irish PMs agreed upon, then this \u2018rhetoric\u2026 was drawn upon to justify particularly harsh measures\u2019.[31]<\/a> This is a \u201cpropaganda model\u201d known today as the \u2018manufacturing of consent.\u2019[32]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The above statistical and anecdotal (qualitative) information suggests that Bloody Sunday was a watershed moment in terms of the overall course of action for pursuit of civil and political rights for the Northern Irish, but not necessarily transformative. The indifference of British officials and media outlets to the deaths of innocents is disgraceful and audacious considering their hand in creating the precursory environment, but not necessarily new. The detachment and disengagement from relevant powers overseas was long standing, rooted in the British governments \u2018emphasising the internal nature of the problem,\u2019 and perception of the Island across the channel as alien to itself. The reaction to that days events is more significant as a turning point, since the methods of both British soldiers and internment protestors had been seen at Magilligan Strand prior. Bloody Sunday was also not the first instance of British inquiry in Northern Ireland, in the House of Commons Merlyn Rees refers to the need for speed of the Widgery Inquiry, compared to \u2018others.\u2019[33]<\/a> The first contribution to the traditionally acceptable and official body of British parliament does reveal two turning points; the ferocious response of the Irish public and consequent call for mediation from a global human rights organisation. This assistance was never offered, which allowed the conflict to worsen, as seen in death tolls and can be inferred from widespread political radicalisation. This can be interpreted as Bloody Sunday causing incessant violence and social polarisation. The IRA ceasefire in May 1972 is evidence of this; all sides were exhausted by war. In sum, Bloody Sunday \u2018remains one of the most controversial and traumatic operational incidents in the history of the modern British Army.\u2019[34]<\/a> It affected all aspects of culture, political and otherwise, which caused the reinvigoration of the IRA, simultaneous with the hope for a ceasefire, and legal or judicial processes had the opposite than intended effect in agitating Irish independence sentiment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[1]<\/a> Hansard (1972) Northern Ireland. <\/em>Available at: https:\/\/api.parliament.uk\/historic-hansard\/commons\/1972\/jan\/31\/northern-ireland<\/a> [Accessed 5 January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[2]<\/a> Foy, Henry. (2010), \u2018Bloody Sunday: Saville Report v Widgery Report.\u2019 The Guardian, 15th<\/sup> June 2010. Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk\/2010\/jun\/15\/bloody-sunday-saville-report-widgery<\/a> [Accessed 5 January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> Widgery, Lord and Dash, Samuel. \u2018\u201dBloody Sunday,\u201d January 30th<\/sup> 1972\u2019. International Journal of Politics, <\/em>Vol. 10, No. 1, pp54.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Upton, Carol-Anne (2009) \u2018The Performance of Truth and Justice in Northern Ireland: The Case of Bloody Sunday.\u2019 In Get Real. Performance Interventions, <\/em>eds Forsyth, A., Megson, C, pp179. Palgrave Macmillan: London.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[5]<\/a> United Nations (2000) War Crimes. <\/em>Available at: https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/genocideprevention\/war-crimes.shtml<\/a>. [Accessed 7 January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Hernon, Ian. (2021), Bloody Sunday: A Fifty Year Fight for Justice. <\/em>Amberley: Amberley Publishing, pp104.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> Hernon, Ian. (2021), Bloody Sunday: A Fifty Year Fight for Justice. <\/em>Amberley: Amberley Publishing, pp97.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> Radden Keefe, Patrick. Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland. <\/em>William Collins: London, pp93.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a>House of Commons (2010) \u2018The Saville Report.\u2019 London Her Majesty\u2019s Stationery Office, pp57.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> CAIN Web Service (1996-2003) Abstentionism: Sinn F\u00e9in Ard Fheis, 1-2 November 1986 \u2013 Summary of the Issue. <\/em>Available at: CAIN: Issues: Abstentionism: Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1-2 November 1986 \u2013 Summary (ulster.ac.uk)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Beaudette, Donald M. and Kirkpatrick, Andrew B. \u2018Zero-sum of all fears: intergroup threat, contact, and voting behaviour in Northern Ireland\u2019. European Political Science Review, <\/em>9:1, pp57.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[12]<\/a>Osbourne, Robert D. \u2018The Northern Ireland parliamentary electoral system: The 1929 reappointment\u2019. Irish Geography, <\/em>Vol. 12, pp43.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Beaudette, Donald M. and Kirkpatrick, Andrew B. \u2018Zero-sum of all fears: intergroup threat, contact, and voting behaviour in Northern Ireland\u2019. European Political Science Review, <\/em>9:1, pp58.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Tropp, L.R. and T.F. Pettigrew (2005), \u2018Relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice among minority and majority status groups\u2019, Psychological Science<\/em> 16(12), pp951.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> Racioppi, Linda and O\u2019Sullivan, Katherine. \u2018\u2019This We Will Maintain\u2019: Gender, Ethno-nationalism and the Politics of Unionism in Northern Ireland\u2019. Nations and Nationalism, <\/em>Vol. 7, Issue. 1, pp96.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> Aitken, Ian. \u2018Stormont suspended- Heath: fresh start\u2019. The Guardian, 25th<\/sup> March 1972. Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/1972\/mar\/25\/past.ianaitken<\/a> [Accessed 3rd January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> Morrison, John. \u2018The Ulster Government and Internal Opposition\u2019, The Ulster Cover-Up.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> NICRA (2008) About Us. <\/em>Available at: https:\/\/nicivilrights.org\/about-us\/<\/a> [Accessed 7th<\/sup> January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> His Excellency the Governor of Northern Ireland (1969) \u2018Cameron Report: Disturbances in Northern Ireland.\u2019 Belfast: Her Majesty\u2019s Stationery Office. Available at: CAIN: Derry March \u2013 Summary (ulster.ac.uk)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> House of Commons (2010) \u2018The Saville Report.\u2019 London Her Majesty\u2019s Stationery Office. Pp504.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> CAIN Archive (1996-2023.) \u2018Bloody Sunday\u2019, 30th<\/sup> January 1972- A Chronology of Events. <\/em>Available at: CAIN: Events: Bloody Sunday \u2013 Chronology (ulster.ac.uk)<\/a> [Accessed 4th<\/sup> January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[22]<\/a> Woodwell, Douglas. \u2018The \u201cTroubles\u201d of Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-developed State.\u2019 World Bank, <\/em>2005, pp164.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> Racioppi, Linda and O\u2019Sullivan, Katherine. \u2018\u2019This We Will Maintain\u2019: Gender, Ethno-nationalism and the Politics of Unionism in Northern Ireland\u2019. Nations and Nationalism, <\/em>Vol. 7, Issue. 1, pp96.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> Cowell, Alan. (2022,) \u201950 Years On, Bloody Sunday\u2019s Wounds Are Still Felt.\u2019 New York Times (New York), 29th<\/sup> January 2022. Available at: https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/01\/29\/world\/europe\/bloody-sunday-ireland.html<\/a> [Accessed 8th January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> Coogan, Tim Pat. (2002) The troubles: Ireland\u2019s ordeal, 1966-1996, and the search for peace. <\/em>New York: Palgrave for St Martin\u2019s Press, pp107.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> Bowcott, Owen. (2010,) \u2018The legacy of the Bloody Sunday Killings.\u2019 The Guardian (London,) 15th<\/sup> June 2010. Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk\/2010\/jun\/15\/legacy-bloody-sunday-killings<\/a> [Accessed 7th January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n [27]<\/a> Bowcott, Owen. (2010,) \u2018The legacy of the Bloody Sunday Killings.\u2019 The Guardian (London,) 15th<\/sup> June 2010. Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk\/2010\/jun\/15\/legacy-bloody-sunday-killings<\/a> [Accessed 7th January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[28]<\/a> McCann, Eamonn. (2012,) \u2018Bloody Sunday helped reconcile Southern nationalists to partition.\u2019 The Irish Times (Dublin,) 28th<\/sup> January 2012. Available at: https:\/\/www.irishtimes.com\/opinion\/bloody-sunday-helped-reconcile-southern-nationalists-to-partition-1.453388<\/a> [Accessed 6th January 2024.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/a>[29]<\/a> House of Commons (2023) \u2018Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023.\u2019 London: Her Majesty\u2019s Stationery Office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [30]<\/a> Butler, Amy Maria. \u2018Lessons Unlearned: Bloody Sunday and the Conduct of British Armed Forces in Conflict\u2019. York Law Review, <\/em>Vol. 2, pp49.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [31]<\/a> Campbell, Colm. \u2018\u2019Wars On Terror\u2019 and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, International Law, and the Northern Ireland Conflict\u2019. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, <\/em>Vol. 75, P. 1, pp325.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/news-1.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nA Contested Past- the Widgery Report and notes on historiography.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nBreaking point?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Departure from tradition- violence is the answer?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nImpact on Irish culture and society.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nNorthern Ireland and the Troubles legacy today.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Bibliography<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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