![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/Sean-Bean-Bravo-Two-Zero.jpg\")
Introduction \u2013 Who are the Special Air Service?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe British Armed Forces consists of many components across hundreds and thousands of personnel across the United Kingdom and wider world, yet the supposedly most covert units \u2013 Special Forces (SF) \u2013 get the most coverage in both the media and popular culture.[1]<\/a> This constant cultural subjugation of highly trained elite warriors has created a general public perception that simply the status of special forces justifies some of the horrific acts of violence conducted in the field under the pretext of national security.[2]<\/a> Simultaneously, we have witnessed a rise in internal \u201celevation\u201d of special forces which has led to a policy-level justification of morally ambiguous special forces action.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2022\/01\/wmplayer_2011-05-24_19-42-02-12.png\")
The Special Air Service as depicted in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare <\/em>(Infinity Ward, 2019).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nBy combining these ideas, an apparent trend appears: a highly positive public perception combined with unrestricted rules of engagement (RoE) creates a defence mechanism of subconscious public and political authorisation even in light of evidence contradicting the legality of special forces actions. I have dubbed this term \u2018mythos shielding\u2019, the legal shield forged in myth that shrouds or excuses illegal action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This webpage will attempt to explain the phenomenon of \u2018mythos shielding\u2019 in relation the Special Air Service (SAS), and seeks to answer question relating to SAS ethics, conduct and culture \u2013 both within the military and the public at large.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
…<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Brief and Bloody History of the SAS<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nFor this argument to have any serious standing, mythos shielding must be grounded in the direct history of the SAS and special forces literature. SAS literature is widely available, and this history will not be comprehensive, but it is important for the context of this webpage.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/SAS-Regiment-Badge.jpg\")
Special Air Service Regiment Emblem, with their motto “who dares wins”. The Emblem is accompanied by the various campaigns the regiment fought in the Twentieth Century. (Fellows, R. Military Medals<\/em>, Pinterest).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/David-Stirling.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThe Special Air Service was a Regiment founded by Commando-Trained Scots Guard David Stirling, an officer of the British Army who requested the creation of a small, highly elite unit that could infiltrate and sabotage Nazi operations in Africa.[4]<\/a> The subsequent successes of sabotage missions of Rommel\u2019s tanks in Africa, as well as disruption of Luftwaffe operations were highly successful.[5]<\/a> Similar operations took place in Sicily and Italy, with amphibious raids and tactical infiltrations.[6]<\/a> These operations were limited to 1944, which saw the first wide scale usage of commando units, rendering special forces a permanent feature of modern warfare.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nHowever, for the British, the government policy of army reduction led to a (brief) disbanding of the SAS from 1945-1947. The reignition of conflict with Western and Soviet Russian aggression led to the War Office suggesting that the prior success of clandestine operations should lead to permanent establishment of the SAS.[8]<\/a> Historian Grob-Fitzgibbon argues that from the early 1950s, the SAS was a state tool used to project British power in sinister ways, conducting lethal action outside the realms of conventional warfare in communist and post-colonial states.[9]<\/a> For the SAS, this translated into bloody excursions into Malaya from 1948-1960, in which the successes of the regiment was limited of Malaya was limited, with the SAS being able to claim only 108 combatants killed out of the 6,398 insurgents killed.[10]<\/a> This did not render the SAS useless, as the importance of intelligence collected by special forces in Malaya not only solidified and justified the unit\u2019s existence in the British Army, but also saw its refinement into two units \u2013 to be kept as an \u201c elite force in a scaled down regular army\u201d.[11]<\/a>[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/SAS-Malayan-Emergency.jpg\")
SAS Soldiers operate during the Malayan Emergency, 1957. (PocketmagsAU, History of War, Vol 96.<\/em>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/British-22-SAS-operators-inside-Northern-Ireland.jpg\")
British Operators of the 22nd Regiment inside of Northern Ireland during the troubles. (Reddit)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThis in practice translated to a policy shift for SAS operations, to being primarily intelligence gathering and rapid response in the post-Malayan Insurgency landscape.[13]<\/a> Special Air Service deployments across multiple theatres such as Yemen, Aden and Oman were structured around highly specialised, small, and self-sustaining units throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nYet of the most important developments in the history of the SAS was the British Governments open acknowledgement and authorisation of SAS reconnaissance and intelligence inside Northern Ireland from January 1976.[15]<\/a> SAS usage coincided with legal expansions on the jailing of political extremism and gave United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) the legal justification for the creation of \u201cpsudo-gangs\u201d to cause \u201c[demoralisation] or to terrorise [communities]\u201d.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Key turning point for public perception of the Special Air Service was the dramatic broadcasting of the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege, which involved the use of the SAS to end the hostage crisis by eliminating the six armed hostage takers.[17]<\/a> Codenamed \u201cOperation Nimrod\u201d, the immense success of the operation was deliberately used as a show of force by prime minister Margaret Thatcher, making the SAS a \u201cnational treasure\u201d, with the regiment garnering favour with the public and policymakers alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2024\/01\/SAS-Iranian-Embassy-Siege.png\")
SAS Soldiers Preparing for the assult on the Iranian Embassy – National Army Museum<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wordpress.aber.ac.uk\/british-armys-image\/files\/2022\/01\/old-sas.jpg\")
The Assault on the Iranian Embassy – National Army Museum<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n\u201cAnother of [Margaret Thatcher\u2019s] achievements was to bring the SAS out of the shadows. At the siege we had smoke generators ready to be initiated as the assault went in. They would have put a smokescreen down and blocked the view of the world\u2019s media. Word came down from Mrs Thatcher via Cobra: \u2018\u2018don\u2019t initiate the smoke generators.” She wanted the whole assault on the TV screens to send a message to the world\u2019s terrorists.\u201d <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\u2013 Former SAS operative Pete Winner.[18]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/cite><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\nWith the fall of the Soviet Union, the UK government narrowed its focus to combatting terrorism on a global scale.[19]<\/a> Combined with defence budget cuts in the 1990s, the utilisation and overreliance on smaller, elite units such as the SAS were the perfect tool for policy makers to deal with asymmetrical threats in a cost-effective way.[20]<\/a> Representing a further concentration of SAS power, budget cuts meant that personnel were highly well equipped, trained and had policy tailored towards their operations.[21]<\/a> The SAS were utilised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on reconnaissance, distraction and search-and-destroy missions of Iraqi missile sites.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
By combining these ideas, an apparent trend appears: a highly positive public perception combined with unrestricted rules of engagement (RoE) creates a defence mechanism of subconscious public and political authorisation even in light of evidence contradicting the legality of special forces actions. I have dubbed this term \u2018mythos shielding\u2019, the legal shield forged in myth that shrouds or excuses illegal action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This webpage will attempt to explain the phenomenon of \u2018mythos shielding\u2019 in relation the Special Air Service (SAS), and seeks to answer question relating to SAS ethics, conduct and culture \u2013 both within the military and the public at large.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
…<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Brief and Bloody History of the SAS<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nFor this argument to have any serious standing, mythos shielding must be grounded in the direct history of the SAS and special forces literature. SAS literature is widely available, and this history will not be comprehensive, but it is important for the context of this webpage.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n Special Air Service Regiment Emblem, with their motto “who dares wins”. The Emblem is accompanied by the various campaigns the regiment fought in the Twentieth Century. (Fellows, R. Military Medals<\/em>, Pinterest).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThe Special Air Service was a Regiment founded by Commando-Trained Scots Guard David Stirling, an officer of the British Army who requested the creation of a small, highly elite unit that could infiltrate and sabotage Nazi operations in Africa.[4]<\/a> The subsequent successes of sabotage missions of Rommel\u2019s tanks in Africa, as well as disruption of Luftwaffe operations were highly successful.[5]<\/a> Similar operations took place in Sicily and Italy, with amphibious raids and tactical infiltrations.[6]<\/a> These operations were limited to 1944, which saw the first wide scale usage of commando units, rendering special forces a permanent feature of modern warfare.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nHowever, for the British, the government policy of army reduction led to a (brief) disbanding of the SAS from 1945-1947. The reignition of conflict with Western and Soviet Russian aggression led to the War Office suggesting that the prior success of clandestine operations should lead to permanent establishment of the SAS.[8]<\/a> Historian Grob-Fitzgibbon argues that from the early 1950s, the SAS was a state tool used to project British power in sinister ways, conducting lethal action outside the realms of conventional warfare in communist and post-colonial states.[9]<\/a> For the SAS, this translated into bloody excursions into Malaya from 1948-1960, in which the successes of the regiment was limited of Malaya was limited, with the SAS being able to claim only 108 combatants killed out of the 6,398 insurgents killed.[10]<\/a> This did not render the SAS useless, as the importance of intelligence collected by special forces in Malaya not only solidified and justified the unit\u2019s existence in the British Army, but also saw its refinement into two units \u2013 to be kept as an \u201c elite force in a scaled down regular army\u201d.[11]<\/a>[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nSAS Soldiers operate during the Malayan Emergency, 1957. (PocketmagsAU, History of War, Vol 96.<\/em>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nBritish Operators of the 22nd Regiment inside of Northern Ireland during the troubles. (Reddit)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThis in practice translated to a policy shift for SAS operations, to being primarily intelligence gathering and rapid response in the post-Malayan Insurgency landscape.[13]<\/a> Special Air Service deployments across multiple theatres such as Yemen, Aden and Oman were structured around highly specialised, small, and self-sustaining units throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nYet of the most important developments in the history of the SAS was the British Governments open acknowledgement and authorisation of SAS reconnaissance and intelligence inside Northern Ireland from January 1976.[15]<\/a> SAS usage coincided with legal expansions on the jailing of political extremism and gave United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) the legal justification for the creation of \u201cpsudo-gangs\u201d to cause \u201c[demoralisation] or to terrorise [communities]\u201d.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Key turning point for public perception of the Special Air Service was the dramatic broadcasting of the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege, which involved the use of the SAS to end the hostage crisis by eliminating the six armed hostage takers.[17]<\/a> Codenamed \u201cOperation Nimrod\u201d, the immense success of the operation was deliberately used as a show of force by prime minister Margaret Thatcher, making the SAS a \u201cnational treasure\u201d, with the regiment garnering favour with the public and policymakers alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\nSAS Soldiers Preparing for the assult on the Iranian Embassy – National Army Museum<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nThe Assault on the Iranian Embassy – National Army Museum<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n\u201cAnother of [Margaret Thatcher\u2019s] achievements was to bring the SAS out of the shadows. At the siege we had smoke generators ready to be initiated as the assault went in. They would have put a smokescreen down and blocked the view of the world\u2019s media. Word came down from Mrs Thatcher via Cobra: \u2018\u2018don\u2019t initiate the smoke generators.” She wanted the whole assault on the TV screens to send a message to the world\u2019s terrorists.\u201d <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\u2013 Former SAS operative Pete Winner.[18]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/cite><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\nWith the fall of the Soviet Union, the UK government narrowed its focus to combatting terrorism on a global scale.[19]<\/a> Combined with defence budget cuts in the 1990s, the utilisation and overreliance on smaller, elite units such as the SAS were the perfect tool for policy makers to deal with asymmetrical threats in a cost-effective way.[20]<\/a> Representing a further concentration of SAS power, budget cuts meant that personnel were highly well equipped, trained and had policy tailored towards their operations.[21]<\/a> The SAS were utilised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on reconnaissance, distraction and search-and-destroy missions of Iraqi missile sites.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThe Special Air Service was a Regiment founded by Commando-Trained Scots Guard David Stirling, an officer of the British Army who requested the creation of a small, highly elite unit that could infiltrate and sabotage Nazi operations in Africa.[4]<\/a> The subsequent successes of sabotage missions of Rommel\u2019s tanks in Africa, as well as disruption of Luftwaffe operations were highly successful.[5]<\/a> Similar operations took place in Sicily and Italy, with amphibious raids and tactical infiltrations.[6]<\/a> These operations were limited to 1944, which saw the first wide scale usage of commando units, rendering special forces a permanent feature of modern warfare.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n However, for the British, the government policy of army reduction led to a (brief) disbanding of the SAS from 1945-1947. The reignition of conflict with Western and Soviet Russian aggression led to the War Office suggesting that the prior success of clandestine operations should lead to permanent establishment of the SAS.[8]<\/a> Historian Grob-Fitzgibbon argues that from the early 1950s, the SAS was a state tool used to project British power in sinister ways, conducting lethal action outside the realms of conventional warfare in communist and post-colonial states.[9]<\/a> For the SAS, this translated into bloody excursions into Malaya from 1948-1960, in which the successes of the regiment was limited of Malaya was limited, with the SAS being able to claim only 108 combatants killed out of the 6,398 insurgents killed.[10]<\/a> This did not render the SAS useless, as the importance of intelligence collected by special forces in Malaya not only solidified and justified the unit\u2019s existence in the British Army, but also saw its refinement into two units \u2013 to be kept as an \u201c elite force in a scaled down regular army\u201d.[11]<\/a>[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n This in practice translated to a policy shift for SAS operations, to being primarily intelligence gathering and rapid response in the post-Malayan Insurgency landscape.[13]<\/a> Special Air Service deployments across multiple theatres such as Yemen, Aden and Oman were structured around highly specialised, small, and self-sustaining units throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet of the most important developments in the history of the SAS was the British Governments open acknowledgement and authorisation of SAS reconnaissance and intelligence inside Northern Ireland from January 1976.[15]<\/a> SAS usage coincided with legal expansions on the jailing of political extremism and gave United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) the legal justification for the creation of \u201cpsudo-gangs\u201d to cause \u201c[demoralisation] or to terrorise [communities]\u201d.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Key turning point for public perception of the Special Air Service was the dramatic broadcasting of the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege, which involved the use of the SAS to end the hostage crisis by eliminating the six armed hostage takers.[17]<\/a> Codenamed \u201cOperation Nimrod\u201d, the immense success of the operation was deliberately used as a show of force by prime minister Margaret Thatcher, making the SAS a \u201cnational treasure\u201d, with the regiment garnering favour with the public and policymakers alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAnother of [Margaret Thatcher\u2019s] achievements was to bring the SAS out of the shadows. At the siege we had smoke generators ready to be initiated as the assault went in. They would have put a smokescreen down and blocked the view of the world\u2019s media. Word came down from Mrs Thatcher via Cobra: \u2018\u2018don\u2019t initiate the smoke generators.” She wanted the whole assault on the TV screens to send a message to the world\u2019s terrorists.\u201d <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\u2013 Former SAS operative Pete Winner.[18]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/cite><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n With the fall of the Soviet Union, the UK government narrowed its focus to combatting terrorism on a global scale.[19]<\/a> Combined with defence budget cuts in the 1990s, the utilisation and overreliance on smaller, elite units such as the SAS were the perfect tool for policy makers to deal with asymmetrical threats in a cost-effective way.[20]<\/a> Representing a further concentration of SAS power, budget cuts meant that personnel were highly well equipped, trained and had policy tailored towards their operations.[21]<\/a> The SAS were utilised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on reconnaissance, distraction and search-and-destroy missions of Iraqi missile sites.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n